Gasoline prices in many markets follow a saw-toothed pattern known as an Edgeworth Cycle. Lewis (2009) introduces a novel way of measuring the shape of the cycle, the median change in price, and regresses this against a number of explanatory variables in US markets. Here, we undertake a similar regression analysis, but using data from Perth, Australia, and with a novel measure of market structure as a regressor. We also explore a novel measure, based on spectral analysis, of the use of cycles in a mixed strategy, and the factors which drive this use.
cyclicality; the use of different cycles in the mixed strategies of gasoline stations, which we measure using spectral analysis.
Section Two of this paper explores the Edgeworth Cycle literature, whilst Section Three explores the dataset, with a particular focus on the development of the market structure measures and price spectra. Section Four introduces the results of our model based upon Lewis's (2009) 
Edgeworth Cycles
Edgeworth Cycles were first posited as an equilibrium in a dynamic game by Edgeworth (1925) and formalised by Maskin & Tirole (1988) , who gave them their name. Their distinct pattern is shown in Figure One . Maskin & Tirole (1988) show that Edgeworth Cycles are one equilibrium of an alternate move game between symmetric duopolists producing an homogenous good with sufficiently high discount rates and who use Markov-perfect strategies in choosing their price from a finite grid. The cycles arise because, for prices above the minimum, a small reduction in price is sufficient to capture the whole market from a rival until it moves again. At the minimum, it is in the interests of both parties for prices to move up again, and each plays a war of attrition as it waits for the other to raise first. Since the first mover will be out of the market for two periods (the period where it raises and the period when its rival raises to a price slightly below its own), the incentive is to raise the price as high as possible, to capture maximum benefits across the cycle.
Figure One about here
The model has been extended by Eckert (2003) , who allows firms to be of different sizes, by Lau (2001) , who shows that the necessary strategic commitment can arise in simultaneous move games as well, and by Noel (2008) , who relaxes a host of assumptions, such as identical marginal costs, elasticities of demand and product characteristics, as well as extending the model to the three-firm case.
Most of the empirical evidence for Edgeworth Cycles has come from studies of retail petroleum markets, and much of it has come from Canada. Eckert (2003) was the first to study Edgeworth Cycles in Canada, focussing on examining the empirical evidence associated with his differential firm size model, by exploring the extent to which small firms are associated with cities where cycles persist. Eckert further extends the literature in collaborative work with West (Eckert & West, 2004a , b, 2005 and Atkinson (Atkinson, Eckert & West, 2009) , with a particular focus on market differences between Vancouver and Ottawa and, in the latter case, the characteristics of the market in Guelph, Ontario, which is also studied by Atkinson (2009). Noel (2007a, b) also examines Edgeworth Cycles in Canada, through the lens of a Markov-switching model. He explores differences between cities, periods of time (days of the week and months), station characteristics (particularly whether an outlet is controlled by a refiner-marketer or an independent chain), the market penetration of independents and cycle position. The modelling framework he uses allows him to not only explore what drives prices during an upswing or a downswing, but what causes retailers to switch from one part of the cycle to another. Wang (2009) studies Edgeworth Cycles in Perth, using data for a time-frame roughly consistent with our own. However, his focus is different; examining the patterns of relenting to ascertain how the different brands use mixed strategies to determine when they will raise price in the outlets across the city.
Lewis (2009) takes a different approach, measuring the degree to which cycles are sawtoothed with his median change in price measure and then investigating drivers for sawtoothedness via OLS regression. Doyle, Muehlegger & Samphantharak (2008) also use this approach. The median price change measure works because, absent of a trend in prices, a mismatch in the number and size of price increases and decreases will, if the latter dominates, result in a small median change in price. The greater the mismatch, the smaller is the median change in price, and the more saw-toothed the cycle. Lewis (2009) explores the relationship between his median change in price measure and a set of explanatory variables including the market share of independent firms, station density, population, income, number of cars per household and land area.
Dataset
To explore the factors which influence the pattern of pricing at each retail petroleum outlet, we make use of data from Perth, Western Australia. Gasoline stations in Western Australia are governed by a unique regulatory regime known as FuelWatch. Each must report its next-day price to the regulator by 2pm. The regulator then publicises that price which comes into effect at 6am the next day, and must remain in effect for 24 hours.
Quite apart from the effect this regulatory regime has on the strategic games that firms play (see Wang, 2009) , or the influence it may or may not have on the price level (see Davidson, 2009 , for an account of this controversy), it provides for the researcher with a census of all prices in Perth. This makes Perth an excellent case study.
Considerable data on the Perth market, and on retail petroleum in Australia in general, can be found in the various recent reports by the ACCC (2007, 2008, 2009 Table 2 are owned by one of the multi-site franchisees of these brands.
Caltex has no multi-site franchises due to the terms of its 1995 merger with Ampol (see Walker & Woodward, 1996 , for details). Instead, it uses single site franchises and a price-support scheme described in detail in Wang (2009) .
Convenience stores attached to retail petroleum outlets are often an important source of profits for the brands which own them. Caltex has two convenience store brands, whilst Shell, Mobil and BP have one apiece. Most Mobil outlets have a convenience store attached, as do around two-thirds of Caltex outlets. The shares for BP and Shell are each less than one-third. None of the independent brands has a convenience store brand, though some (Gull in particular) sell convenience store items in many of their outlets.
Although Perth is a relatively low-density city, retail petroleum outlets tend to be located along highways or at the major shopping centres which exist in some suburbs. This is in part due to zoning laws and in part due to a desire to be located at nodes of demand. For this reason, distance to the nearest rival tends to be low (on average just over one km) and the average number of competitors within five kilometres is nine. 
Market Structure
An important aspect of this paper is the way in which we measure market structure.
Rather than use an indirect measure, such as seller density or, as in the Edgeworth cycle literature reviewed in Section 2 above, the penetration of independents, we develop a simple theoretical model of bilateral competitive interaction and use this to determine who competes with whom. We collect these bilateral links to form a network, which summarises the structure of competition in the marketplaces as a whole and use simple graph-cutting tools to delineate local sub-markets. We then use a number of measures of network structure from the mathematical sociology literature to summarise the position of each retail gasoline outlet in the overall structure of the global market and local submarkets. These measures are used as regressors in the models outlined in Sections 4 and 5. We describe the process of network formation and division briefly below, and in more
The simple theoretical model is based upon that of Hoover (1937) and MacBride (1983) , who study how spatial differentiation can give rise to local market power. Our point of departure is to assume that consumers come to the retailer rather than having goods delivered to them, and this requires the retailer to set a single price for all consumers without knowing from whence each has come.
We examine a duopoly where each firm sells one unit of an homogenous good to a set of consumers whose travel plans take them past one retail gasoline outlet but who must deviate to frequent another (meaning purchase from the former is costless but that from the latter is not). Each firm has two choices; set a higher price than its rival and collect rents from those customers for whom deviation to its rival is costly, or set a price lower than its rival and endeavour to steal market share. The advantages of each choice change depending upon overall price levels, and it is relatively simple to show the situations whereby this will give rise to an Edgeworth Cycle. It is also relatively simple to show that the minima of such price cycles will be related in a consistent fashion where firms compete. Moreover, if marginal costs and the proportion passing each outlet first are equal, one can easily show that the minimum of each price cycle for each outlet in the duopoly will be the same (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010b ).
This gives rise to a simple criterion of connection. We first form the series of price cycle minima for each gasoline station by taking the lowest price in the three days prior to each price increase of greater than five percent. 4 We then undertake a simple statistical test of the difference between the means for each pair of outlets within five kilometres of one another. 5 Where there is no statistically significant difference between the means, we deem the two outlets to be connected. By collecting these connected pairs, we are able to construct a network that summarises the patterns of connection in the overall market.
We then divide this network in to a series of submarkets, using an approach pioneered by Gould (1967) , and subsequently widely used in geography (see, for example, Brookfield, 1973 ): Cliff, Haggett & Ord, 1979 , Boots: 1985 , O'hUallachain, 1985 : Thill, 1998 : Tinkler, 1972 and 1975 , Hay, 1975; and Straffin, 1980) .
The network is first converted into an adjacency matrix; a symmetric, zero-one matrix where a zero in the ij th position indicates that nodes i and j are not connected, and a one indicates that they are. We then take the eigenvectors of this adjacency matrix. The first (that is, the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue) has all positive entries. In order to be orthogonal to the first, the remaining eigenvectors must contain positive and negative elements. Gould (1967) suggests that clusters of positive and negative eigenvector elements indicate sub-groups in the overall network. The approach is somewhat judgemental, but subsequent testing of the submarkets suggests they are reasonably robust (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010a) , and indeed gives groups where prices are more similar than in intra-brand groupings.
The results of following Gould's (1967) approach, using the second to sixth eigenvectors (after which the signal to noise ratio makes it impossible to uncover further structure), divides the market into eight distinct sub-markets. Figure Two , overleaf, shows the overall market with the eight sub-markets superimposed. The dark-grey area represents the Swan River, which divides the city North from South, and the light-grey line represents the main north-south freeway, which divides East from West. Placement of each station is approximate, but roughly correlates to the physical shape of the Perth market. 6 The different shaded dots represent different brands.
Figure Two about here mathematical sociology literature. 7 We use one measure of centrality and three measures that reflect Burt's (1992) notion of a structural hole in a network. Centrality is measured using the approach of Bonacich (1972 Bonacich ( , 1987 , who bases his measure on elements of the leading eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. The importance of structural holes, or the parts of the network where there are few connections between densely intra-connected sub-groups, was first suggested by Burt (1992) who developed a series of measures associated with them. His notion is that those nodes at either end of links between sub-groups will be able to leverage considerable informational advantage due to their location.
To capture structural holes, Burt (1992) uses a number of measures. What Burt (1992) terms the redundant portion of one node's relationship with another node is the extent to which their relationship is through other nodes connected to both of them. The more indirect connections the two nodes have, the more redundant are these connections, as there are many paths down which information can flow. The effective size of the network for a given node is the sum of the non-redundant portions of its relationships with all other nodes in the network, and ranges from one to N, the total number of nodes in the network. The efficiency of the network for a given node is its effective size divided by N. A more efficient network is one where structural holes are better situated from the perspective of the node for which efficiency is being calculated.
Constraint is the absence of structural holes, meaning that, even if a node severs its direct connection with another node, indirect connections mean that it is still restricted by that node. Burt (1992) defines constraint as the sum of the proportion of network time spent on connections with a given node and across all other nodes which that node and the node for which constraint is being calculated are connected to.
We make use of Burt's (1992) measures of efficiency and constraint, and also limited use of his measure of redundancy. We calculate the centrality, efficiency and constrain scores for each outlet, both globally and in each local sub-market, using the Ucinet software developed by Borgatti, Everett & Freeman (2002) . The distribution of scores for each of the network characteristics is presented in Table Three . Note that we have normalised the centrality scores such that they range from zero to one, like the constraint and efficiency scores. 
Prices
In Sections Four and Five, we explore two models; with median change in price and spectral power as the dependent variables, respectively. Here we explore the data underlying these two dependent variables in more detail, beginning with spectral power.
Spectral power summarises the amount of variation in prices which can be attributed to cycles of a particular length. The higher the spectral power for a particular cycle, the more that cycle is used in the pricing strategies of the relevant gasoline station. 
Figure Three about here
The most obvious aspect of Figure Three is the dual peak at seven and ten days. 11 This is most pronounced for BP and Shell. It is not the case that some outlets follow cycles of seven days and some follow cycles of ten days; most in fact exhibit peaks at both frequency bands. It is this dual peak that is suggestive of the use of mixed strategies.
The dual peak should not be surprising. Indeed, it is more logical than a single peak. If a retail petroleum outlet consistently followed a seven day cycle, this would become immediately obvious to all of its rivals, each of whom could then underbid it on the eighth day and capture market share. 
Calculation of Lewis

Figure Four about here
Median Price Change Model
We now turn to the first of our models; that exploring factors influencing the median change in price. The basic form of the model is as follows:
The variables in Equation One are defined in Table Four below.
Table Four about here
We test a number of different forms of the model defined in Equation One, omitting different independent variables. The results for the model which, based upon likelihood ratio tests, best fits the data are presented in Table Five .
Table Five about here
The F-test and R-squared results suggest, respectively, that the model is valid and fits the data reasonably well. The Breusch-Pagan test statistic suggests homoscedasticity.
There appears to be little influence on median change in price from any of the network structure variables; only global eigenvector centrality, is significant and only then at the ten percent level. It suggests that more central outlets are the ones with higher median price changes and hence cycles which are less saw-toothed in nature, but the coefficient is very small.
The independent brands and Woolworths, along with the branded independents and larger independent types tend to have higher median price changes, and hence cycles with a less saw-toothed nature, than the omitted dummies. This may be reflective of these outlets increasing their prices more cautiously; often taking two days when the Majors take one.
Very few of the variables in Table Five some important changes to the network characteristic variables. Global centrality loses its significance, but global constraint becomes negative and significant at the five percent level, whilst local efficiency and local constraint become positive and significant at the ten percent level.
The negative global constraint coefficient suggests that more constrained outlets are likely to have cycles with sharper upswings, which may be suggestive of outlets sitting at the junction points between sub-markets (the least constrained in the dataset) acting to attenuate price signals travelling between sub-markets.
The positive local constraint and local efficiency coefficients at first appear counterintuitive. A positive local efficiency coefficient suggests similar conclusions to the negative global constraint conclusion; that those in a good position (here a position for which the local market is efficient for the given retailer) can exploit the informational advantage that results and leverage some market power. However, the positive local constraint coefficient does not fit this story. Further examination shows that the outlets with the higher local constraint scores tend to be on the periphery of each local market (and indeed on the periphery of the Perth market as a whole), and we suggest that what is actually occurring is that these outlets, with access to customers unavailable to those not on the periphery, exploit their higher degree of market power by charging these customers higher prices rather than fighting for the customers they must share with nonperipheral outlets.
Spectral Power Models
The spectral power models are intended to capture the extent to which outlets use more or less of a cycle of a given length in their pricing strategies, and the factors that might drive such a decision. The models have the form below, where again the variables are as defined in Table Four , except SPM7 and SPM10, which refer to the spectral power of the seven and ten day cycles in margins, respectively: As with the median change in price model above, we examine more restrictive forms of the models by dropping independent variables and conducting likelihood ratio tests to ascertain whether this provides more robust results. The seven-day cycle regression results favour a slightly more restrictive model (omitting the DCHAR variables) than the ten-day cycle regression, but we use the more general model in both cases to allow a comparison of like with like. The results of these analyses are shown in Table Six . Table   Six , with the exception noted below. Thus the models do not appear to be mis-specified.
The results above are reasonably consistent with those in the median price change regressions. The globally more constrained outlets are more likely to exhibit price cycles of both durations, but are most likely to be using more seven-day cycles in their mix of strategies. Thus, those outlets with cycles with sharper upswings are also likely to exhibit shorter cycles. Similar conclusions as drawn above for median changes in price might also be drawn for local efficiency and constraint in Table Six . Local efficiency and constraint results are negative, with both having a higher absolute value for seven-day cycles. This suggests that those with some market power (due either to superior location in the market or to peripheral location with access to consumers others cannot access) use cycles less in their mixed strategies, and seven-day cycles least.
Global centrality is significant at the ten percent level, and is negative, suggesting that more central outlets are less likely to have either kind of cycle and least likely to have ten-day cycles. This is consistent with the median price change results, where such outlets exhibited cycles which are less saw-toothed, and is similarly weak as alterations to the model specification mean this variable loses its significance.
Differences in results for submarkets are not particularly clear, but those for branding are; all brands have less cycle power than the omitted dummy, Shell. Recall from Figure Three that the Shell outlets had the highest spectral power across these two bands. This same result is reflected in the branding coefficients.
Branded independents and larger independents are both likely to make less use of cycles than the omitted case (company controlled outlets). This is consistent with the results for median price in that these outlets cycle less and have cycles with a less saw-toothed nature. In general, however, these outlets have higher prices, suggesting that their procompetitive effect is limited in the Perth market once location in the market structure is taken into account.
There are very few demand characteristics that are significant. The only one which is significant across both regressions is the number of competitors within five kilometres (DCHAR15), and it is positive. This suggests that seller density leads to more cycles.
Thus, if more players lead to more competition, one could infer that cycles are procompetitive. The fact that the coefficient is the same for both types of cycle suggests that this demand-side factor does not favour one kind of cycle over another.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored factors which drive both the Edgeworth shape of retail petroleum prices in the Perth market and the degree to which each outlet utilises cycles of a particular length in its mixed strategies. The former we measure using Lewis's (2009) measure, the median change in price, and the latter we measure via the spectral power of the two most common cycles seen in the data. The latter measure is novel to this paper, although Wang (2009) has also explored the use of mixed strategies in the Perth retail petroleum market in a different context by examining which brand leads prices upwards in each cycle.
We also introduce a novel measure of market structure. Whereas previous papers in the literature have proxied market structure by use of variables, such as density of sellers or numbers of independents, we measure it here more directly by developing a network outlining which outlets compete with which. Then we use methods from the mathematical sociology literature and from geography to develop summary statistics for these networks that can then form inputs into the regression.
We find that market structure does influence both the shape of cycles and their length, and the results suggest that a position wherein outlets can exercise a degree of market power both decrease the saw-toothed nature of cycles and decrease their use of both types of cycles. Demand factors, interestingly, appear to play little role in the shape or the length of cycles. Greater independence from the Majors, either through independent ownership or through being an independent brand, tends to decrease the saw-toothed nature of cycles and the use of cycles, but all brands make less use of cycles than Shell does. This suggests that independents might not have the pro-competitive effect found elsewhere in the Edgeworth Cycle literature, once market location is taken into account.
The results of this study are useful not only for the light they shed on market behaviour, but also for the novel techniques introduced. The use of spectral analysis allows for a more subtle appreciation of the use of cycles than has existed previously, particularly in structure, which might find use not only in academic studies, but also in competition policy. In particular, our results using the new measures suggest that competition is a more complex phenomenon than often recognised in either academic research or policy formulation. 
